Nietzsche on Monotheism and Polytheism - Note

Nietzsche’s pen in The Gay Science, s.125, resurrects Diogenes the Cynic in the form of a wise madman who despite the light of day lit a lantern, running around the market, looking for God! 

Kierkegaard: "Without risk, there is no faith" - Note

In the 'Concluding Unscientific Postscript' Kierkegaard radically confronts what was the mainstream theological accent, i.e. to prove God and the authenticity of religious scriptures objectively with reasoning. It is crucial to differentiate his standpoint with who believe that faith and reason, subjectivity and objectivity, are two wings of the same bird and an individual can use either to find God. 

Hume's objections on Argument from Design - Note

In the ‘Dialogues on Natural Religion’, David Hume put forward various objections to the Argument from Design which is a central pillar of natural theology, including William Paley’s version of it. This note briefly explains the three most significant objections David Hume presented to the argument from Design. 

Leibniz's defence in Theodicy against sub-standard world - Note

In the Theodicy, Leibniz rehearses something like a trial in which God stands accused of having created a sub-standard world. In this note I demonstrate the basis of Leibniz’s case for the defence and his advocate for the view that the world God created could not have been made better. 

Mental Disorders and Value-neutral Psychiatry - Note

It is being said that because the definition of mental disorder is always, at least partially, socially constructed we cannot have a ‘value-neutral’ psychiatry. I believe that having a ‘value-free’ psychiatry is tough, if not impossible. 

Science and immoral activities - Note

Historically, some scientific results have been used to justify some sort of immoral actions and decisions, individually, in society, or globally. Based on this some argue that doing science when its results reasonably can be misused is not justified and have to be abandoned. Although I do agree that science in its nature is not completely value-neutral but I do not believe that we should avoid doing science when we have rational justification for believing that the outcomes will be misused. Thinking otherwise may imply at least two fallacies: the ‘One-sidedness Fallacy’ and ‘Perfect Solution Fallacy.' 

Russell Gray on the Evolution of Cognition - Note

Russell Gray’s, an evolutionary biologist and psychologist, in his lecture ‘The Evolution of Cognition without Miracles’ (Nijmegen Lectures, 2014) talks about two different explanations of cognition in animals (‘romantic’ and ‘killjoy’) based on evidences. These two explanations are the claim that some animals like chimpanzees a crows have sort of theory of mind or insights (romantic explanation); or do the evidences support this claim that those animals do not have any kind theory of mind and insights and such traits are uniquely human (killjoy explanation). However, there could be a third explanation.

fMRI, Vegetative State, and Intentional Agency - Note

Adrian Owen et al. in 'Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State' (2008) have used fMRI (Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging) activation patterns of neural activity as a supportive evidence to claim that a patient who previously was assumed to be in a vegetative state has intentional agency. However, it is questionable if such an approach and evidence is sufficient to conclude so. 

Extended Cognition: Otto's notebook - Note

Andy Clark and David Chalmers (1998) in their seminal work on ‘Extended Cognition’ or ‘Extended Mind’, demonstrated a fictional character, Otto, who has a notebook. For the notebook to be functionally identical to Otto’s memory it has to be available to him automatically, involuntarily, and reliably. However, it has been argued that as the notebook does not have these features it cannot be a part of Otto’s mind. I disagree with this claim that for a notebook to be functionally identical to one’s memory, it should be automatically, reliably and involuntarily available to him.

Daniel Dennet's Frame Problem: an Objection - Note

Dennett’s Frame problem manifests that building an artificial intelligence kindred to humans intelligence is impossible.” I disagree with the claim that only based on the Frame problem a human-like Artificial Intelligence (from now on AI) cannot be made. Although the frame problem in the field of AI is very similar to its homonym in philosophy, the latter one challenges a wider epistemological question considerably. 

Science: Value-neutral or Value-laden - Article

Abstract

It is being said that values should have nothing to do with scientific outcomes because science is about objective truth, not what we want to be true; and ‘cognitive science’ is no different. In this essay, I will challenge this notion and will argue that scientific practices are not value-neutral, but they are value-laden. It means that scientific research and outcomes are not just about objective truth. Also, they are not only ‘cognitive values’ that should be considered in practicing science, but ‘moral values’ also have to be taken into account. Cognitive science is not an exception to the range of the implications of these notions.

The key terms I will discuss are ‘value-neutrality of science’ and ‘value-ladenness of science.' Value-neutrality in science means that scientist has to keep her biases and emotions while dealing with scientific research, matter, and situation. Furthermore, scientific researches and outcomes do not imply any particular implications and are not a matter of value judgment because they are merely means to goals. On the other hand, value-ladenness of science says that scientists have not and cannot keep their biases and emotions while dealing with scientific research, matters, and situations. Also, scientists should not be indifferent regarding the implications and usage of the outcomes of their researches. This essay will provide three main arguments in defence of value-ladenness of science. Each of these arguments will follow with some objections and then some answers to these objections will be provided. 

David Chalmers on Consciousness, Easy and Hard Problems, and Physicalism - Essay

Classical physicalism, which is the doctrine in which the physical world is taken to be the only real world, has not provided a plausible account of consciousness. Consciousness experience is as mysterious as it is familiar. This is because although we feel consciousness as the most direct experience, we can ever have but we cannot describe it with an objective viewpoint. It means we cannot account it with any other things we used to interpret other natural events. Here we should differentiate between brain activities, that we can know about them objectively, and consciousness as a first-personal and subjective experience. 

Jerry Fodor: Non-reductionist but Physicalist - Essay

Fodor in The language of Thoughts while discusses some aspects of the theory of mental processes, introduces two kinds of reductionisms: behavioural reductionism and physiological reductionism. Either of these two, as he claims, departs psychology from studying its subject matter that is mental phenomena. However, he expresses that he is a physicalist.