Nietzsche’s pen in The Gay Science, s.125, resurrects Diogenes the Cynic in the form of a wise madman who despite the light of day lit a lantern, running around the market, looking for God!
Nietzsche’s pen in The Gay Science, s.125, resurrects Diogenes the Cynic in the form of a wise madman who despite the light of day lit a lantern, running around the market, looking for God!
Historically, some scientific results have been used to justify some sort of immoral actions and decisions, individually, in society, or globally. Based on this some argue that doing science when its results reasonably can be misused is not justified and have to be abandoned. Although I do agree that science in its nature is not completely value-neutral but I do not believe that we should avoid doing science when we have rational justification for believing that the outcomes will be misused. Thinking otherwise may imply at least two fallacies: the ‘One-sidedness Fallacy’ and ‘Perfect Solution Fallacy.'
It is being said that values should have nothing to do with scientific outcomes because science is about objective truth, not what we want to be true; and ‘cognitive science’ is no different. In this essay, I will challenge this notion and will argue that scientific practices are not value-neutral, but they are value-laden. It means that scientific research and outcomes are not just about objective truth. Also, they are not only ‘cognitive values’ that should be considered in practicing science, but ‘moral values’ also have to be taken into account. Cognitive science is not an exception to the range of the implications of these notions.
The key terms I will discuss are ‘value-neutrality of science’ and ‘value-ladenness of science.' Value-neutrality in science means that scientist has to keep her biases and emotions while dealing with scientific research, matter, and situation. Furthermore, scientific researches and outcomes do not imply any particular implications and are not a matter of value judgment because they are merely means to goals. On the other hand, value-ladenness of science says that scientists have not and cannot keep their biases and emotions while dealing with scientific research, matters, and situations. Also, scientists should not be indifferent regarding the implications and usage of the outcomes of their researches. This essay will provide three main arguments in defence of value-ladenness of science. Each of these arguments will follow with some objections and then some answers to these objections will be provided.
Peter Singer, arguably one of the most prominent living moral philosophers, has discussed moral status of animals in his seminal work ‘Animal Liberation’. In that book, he shed light on the various types of abuses human-animals carrying out on non-human animals. He innovatively coined the term ‘speciesism’ to point out the same fallacious reasoning humans use to abuses of non-human animals. He expressed that speciesism - belief in the superiority of one species over others - follows the same unsound rationale that ‘sexism’ and ‘racism’ did.
Before proposing my opinion on the challenging question of righteous or wrongfulness of euthanasia, I have to clarify what I meant by this term by declaring the definition I do agree with that. Like many other terms, euthanasia has various meanings depending on the context and usage. The Oxford Dictionaries defines euthanasia as “The painless killing of a patient suffering from an incurable and painful disease or in an irreversible coma” and counts mercy killing, assisted suicide, and physician-assisted suicide as its synonyms. More specifically in medical terms, it means the practice of ending a life intentionally to relieve patient's suffering and pain.
However, these lexical definitions fail to determine adequately euthanasia, as they leave some possible actions open that although they may meet the definition, they cannot be seen as euthanasia.
Epicurus (341-270 BC), whom Epicurean philosophy named after him, based his opinion on the institution of pleasure as the humans’ primary real good. In his viewpoint, a good life is one that in which pleasure -to be particular, pleasures with the subtraction of pains- is maximised. To do so, we have to minimise our pains, either bodily or mentally. However, knowing that death is one of the most mentally painful concerns for humans, Epicurus argued that we should not be fearful of death as it means nothing to us (De Botton 2000, 56-60).
Asking about personal identity and its implications are of central questions in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and undoubtedly theology and eschatology. The essential components of this enquiry can be articulated by these questions: Who am I? What am I constituted of? What does differentiate me from others? How do I persist through time? Based on the responses to these enquiries various philosophical accounts of personal identity have been shaped: Substance Dualism, Property Dualism, Predicate Dualism, Continuity of Consciousness, Psychological Continuity, Bundle Theory, and No-Self Theory, to name a few. One of the essential problems in personal identity is identity persistence through time. This problem, which can be articulated as identicalness of an individual at time T1 to an individual at time T2, has significant implications for subsequent questions in the fields of ethics and philosophy of law. The proposed resolution for this problem brings out its practical consequences in ethics, agency, and responsibility.
کتابِ «فرمانِ خداوند»[1] نوشتهی «جان هِر»[2]، همانگونه که از نام آن برمیآید، در پیِ دفاع از نظریهی «فرمانِ الهی» است: نظریهای که در آن آنچه که چیزی را تبدیل به یک الزامِ اخلاقی میکند آن است که خداوند بر آن امر کرده باشد؛ و آنچه که چیزی را یک ناشایستِ اخلاقی میسازد آن است که خداوند از آن نهی کرده باشد. کتاب نگاهی دروندینی به مبانی اساسی اخلاق دارد و به بررسی ارتباطِ میانِ دو نظریهی «فرمان الهی» و «قانون طبیعی» در ادیان ابراهیمی - یهودیت، مسیحیت، و اسلام - میپردازد. همچنین نویسنده با نگاهی به روانشناسی تکاملی[3]، ابراز میدارد که انگارهی «فرمان الهی» در فهمیدن این مطلب که اخلاق چگونه میتواند از نظر تکاملی، پایدار باقی بماند به ما کمک خواهد کرد.کتاب اساساً با مفاهیم فلسفهی معاصر در تعامل است و نویسنده با بهخدمت گرفتن آنها استدلال میکند که اگر بپرسیم «چرا ما باید تلاش کنیم تا از نظر اخلاقی خوب باشیم؟» پاسخِ «چون خداوند به ما اینگونه میگوید» پاسخی معنادار و قابلِ قبول خواهد بود.
آنچه پیشِ رویِ شماست، تلاشی است برای بازگرداندنِ نوشتهای کوتاه از زبانِ انگلیسی به زبانِ فارسی دربارهی «نظریهی فرمانِ الهی» نوشتهی جان هِر، استادِ دانشگاهِ ییل.
آیا وظیفهی اخلاقی مبتنی بر فرمانِ الهی است؟
«نظریهی فرمان الهی» نگرشی است که در آن، آنچه که چیزی را صوابِ اخلاقی میسازد آن است که خداوند بر آن امر کرده باشد؛ و آنچه که چیزی را خطایِ اخلاقی میسازد آن است که خداوند از آن نهی کرده باشد. انتقادات بسیاری بر این نظریه وجود دارد. چهار مورد از مهمترینِ این انتقادات عبارتند از اینکه این نظریه اخلاق را امری خودسرانه میکند؛ و اینکه این نظریه در جامعهای متکثّر به کار نمیآید، و اینکه این نظریه اخلاق را امری نابخردانه خواهد کرد؛ و اینکه این نظریه دارای «دور» باطل است.