It is being said that values should have nothing to do with scientific outcomes because science is about objective truth, not what we want to be true; and ‘cognitive science’ is no different. In this essay, I will challenge this notion and will argue that scientific practices are not value-neutral, but they are value-laden. It means that scientific research and outcomes are not just about objective truth. Also, they are not only ‘cognitive values’ that should be considered in practicing science, but ‘moral values’ also have to be taken into account. Cognitive science is not an exception to the range of the implications of these notions.
The key terms I will discuss are ‘value-neutrality of science’ and ‘value-ladenness of science.' Value-neutrality in science means that scientist has to keep her biases and emotions while dealing with scientific research, matter, and situation. Furthermore, scientific researches and outcomes do not imply any particular implications and are not a matter of value judgment because they are merely means to goals. On the other hand, value-ladenness of science says that scientists have not and cannot keep their biases and emotions while dealing with scientific research, matters, and situations. Also, scientists should not be indifferent regarding the implications and usage of the outcomes of their researches. This essay will provide three main arguments in defence of value-ladenness of science. Each of these arguments will follow with some objections and then some answers to these objections will be provided.